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September/October 2016 // PUBLIC GAMING INTERNATIONAL //

67

that laws against it are working, lawmakers are likely to regulate

and tax it. Some people might say that sports-betting in the U.S.

has passed that threshold. It is conservatively estimated that illegal

sports-betting exceeds $100 billion a year, that 97 percent of the

$4.1 billion bet on last year’s Super bowl was illegal, and that mil-

lions of otherwise law-abiding citizens are betting on sports in the

U.S. in spite of the illegality. At what point does it become imprac-

tical to continue to outlaw it?

Private operators building markets where the boundaries of the

law are not crystal clear is the end-game of the “ask for forgiveness

instead of permission” method.

Mark Hichar:

The legal boundaries that depend on a precise

legal definition of gambling are an example of that. Most may think

that DFS fits state legal definitions of gambling. But, from a legal

point of view, the relevance of chance versus skill and the ways to

measure those are not precisely defined. We are talking not just

about legality versus illegality. We are also talking about ‘gambling’

versus not gambling. Tax rates are higher and regulatory require-

ments more demanding for gambling than for other goods and

services. So, DFS advocates want it to be classified as not gambling

because then it falls under a different tax and regulatory framework.

Another problem is that nobody has a crystal ball to foresee the

implications that current decisions will have on a future that will

be much different than today. When legislators built a carve-out for

Fantasy Sports into the UIGEA back in 2006, nobody could have

foreseen that it could grow to the size that it became ten years later.

Of course, neither the UIGEA nor other federal legislation pro-

hibits states from exercising their prerogative to enact laws that

make DFS or Traditional Fantasy Sports or i-poker or other online

games illegal.

Gordon Medenica:

Doesn’t the diversity of states’ positions as

regards the best regulatory policy for games-of-chance validate the

position that the only way to respect the will and the interests of

the people is to let them decide on a state-by-state basis, and not

impose a federal decree like RAWA?

Mark Hichar: Absolutely. The regulation of gambling has histor-

ically been left to the states, with most federal laws specific to gam-

bling intended to assist the states in the enforcement of their laws.

A key area in which the federal government has acted independent

of the states is in regard to sports-betting, which is prohibited in

all but the four states where it was grandfathered in to the extent

conducted prior to the time the 1992 federal sports betting law

was enacted. Now we have a $149 billion illegal and unregulated

sport-betting market that benefits nobody except the criminals who

are making money from it. Hopefully these counter-productive im-

pacts of federal intrusion into gambling will inform the decision-

making process of federal lawmakers such that states are allowed

to retain control over gambling policy, along with the authority to

clarify the definition of what exactly constitutes “gambling.”

Gordon Medenica:

James … are today’s rogue operators to-

morrow’s mainstream companies? And are there ways that Lottery

can leverage the impacts of change and disruption to the benefit of

its stakeholders?

James Maida:

These gray area private operators would prefer

to navigate a process that leads to them becoming mainstream. For

example, enterprises like FanDuel and Draft Kings cannot go pub-

lic, or at least not optimize their IPO, if they’re operating in a legal

gray zone. That’s at least one of the reasons why they are attempt-

ing to operate transparently, remove ambiguity in the laws, and

push for credibility in other ways. There is the problem, though,

that your tenure as illegal operator can come back to haunt you.

Companies which operated illegally in the past are being required

to account for their past behavior when applying for a license to

operate legally now. I would observe, though, that they seem to be

successful at doing that. It’s a classic example of a particularly edgy

“ask for forgiveness instead of permission” strategy.

Philippe Vlaemminck:

That’s why European operators work

aggressively on both fronts. They work tirelessly to make sure law-

makers at both the member-state level and the EU Commission

level recognize, and hopefully appreciate, the role that lotteries

serve in channeling economic benefit to good causes and providing

the gold standard of consumer protection and Responsible Gam-

ing. But they also vigorously compete in the market-place, applying

technology and innovation in game development and distribution

and every aspect of business and marketing operations.

I would emphatically concur with James’ description of the “ask

for forgiveness instead of permission” approach employed by illegal

operators. And that approach has served them well in pushing law-

makers to evolve regulatory and taxation frameworks in ways that

are not favorable to government lotteries. Lawmakers may decide,

for instance, to allow Lottery to operate in all game-of-chance cat-

egories. That would seem to be good, right? But the quid pro quo

is typically to also implement and regulate and tax model that al-

lows private commercial operators to apply for a license to operate

Panel Discussion

continued from page 50

A London-based internet operator

called

theLotter.com

sold an Oregon

MegaBucks lotto ticket to a player in

Iraq. Companies like Lottoland and

Tipp 24 sell Powerball, Megamillions,

Euromillions, Eurojackpot, and many

of the jurisdictional games online and

into markets where they are not licensed

to sell.

—Gordon Medenica